The economic literature on crime and law enforcement shows that the optimal level of deterrence increases when maximal fines rise. This paper shows that this view may be incorrect. In particular, if the gains from crime can be disgorged, as is usually the case in reality, then increasing the maximal fine may reduce the optimal level of deterrence. This may happen if offenders' wealth is less than the monetary value of the harm that offenders cause.
INTRODUCTION
Many private and business activities generate external harm. For example, oil refineries generate air pollution, overloaded trucks damage highways, messenger services obstruct traffic as they double park, and individuals sometimes litter the streets or speed while driving. To control these harms, the government usually expands resources to apprehend offenders and impose monetary sanctions on them. Since the pioneering work of Becker (1968) , there has been an extensive literature exploring the features of optimal law enforcement, in particular of the optimal probability and magnitude of fines and the optimal level of deterrence (see, for example, Garoupa, 1997; Polinsky and Shavell, 1999, 2007) . This literature gives rise to several basic results. It shows that, under certain conditions, fines should be set to their maximum level, traditionally interpreted as offenders' wealth, and that the expected fine should be less than the external harm resulting from the offense, so that some degree of under-deterrence prevails. The explanations of these results are now well-known. If fines, which are assumed to be a socially costless transfer, were not maximal, any level of deterrence, including the optimal level, could be achieved at lower costs by increasing the fine to its maximum level and reducing the probability of punishment proportionally. This is Becker's argument. Similarly, if the expected fine were equal to the harm, it would be possible to lower the probability of punishment and save enforcement costs without much affecting deterrence, because the marginal offenders would derive gains that were approximately equal to the harm and therefore impose zero net social harm. 1 This is Polinsky and Shavell's point. These results have been qualified in the literature on various grounds, including marginal deterrence, risk aversion, avoidance efforts, and more (see, for example, Garoupa, 1997; Polinsky and Shavell, 1999, 2007) .
The literature on crime and law enforcement also explores the consequences of relaxing the fine constraint, for example, imagining that the wealth of potential offenders has been increased. This literature demonstrates that as the maximal fine rises, the optimal fine should rise as well, but the optimal probability of punishment may either fall or rise depending on the degree of under-deterrence (Lee, 1983; Garoupa, 2001 ). This latter, less familiar result can be explained as follows. If the level of under-deterrence is substantial, greater deterrence can and should be achieved not only by increasing the optimal fine, but also by increasing the optimal probability of punishment. The additional gains from increasing the probability of punishment can now be cost-justified, because as the optimal fine increases, the deterrent value of enforcement expenditures, that is, the effect of the probability of punishment on the expected fine increases as well. To illustrate, when the optimal fine is equal to 400, any 1% increase in the probability of punishment increases the expected fine by 4 (1% times 400), while if the optimal fine is equal to 500, any 1% increase in the probability of punishment has an impact on the expected fine of 5 (1% times 500). 2 Finally, the literature on crime and law enforcement shows that as the maximal fine increases, the optimal level of deterrence always increases and approaches first-best deterrence, that is, a deterrence level which induces offenders to commit harmful acts if and only if their gains exceed the harm (Garoupa, 2001 ). The explanation is this: as the maximal fine rises, the pre-fineincrease optimal level of deterrence can be achieved by increasing the fine and reducing the probability of punishment proportionally. However, since the deterrent value of enforcement expenditures is greater, it is never socially desirable to reduce the probability of punishment all the way down so as to maintain the pre-fine-increase optimal level of deterrence. Instead, since some 1 C l e a r l y, i f t h e e x p e c t e d f i n e we r e g r e a t e r t h a n t h e h a r m, r e d u c i n g t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f punishment would increase social welfare because it would also reduce over-deterrence.
2 If the level of under-deterrence is not substantial, then the optimal probability of punishment should decrease as maximal fines rise. The reason is that much deterrence is gained by the mere fact that the optimal fines are increased. See further discussion in Section 3.
degree of under-deterrence prevails, it is socially desirable to reduce the degree of under-deterrence and achieve greater deterrence. This result is so intuitive that it is sometimes regarded as a "folk theorem" (Garoupa, 1997) . 3 This paper shows that this "folk theorem" is not generally correct. In particular, if the gains from crime can be disgorged, as is the case in many real situations, then increasing the maximal fine may paradoxically decrease the optimal level of deterrence and consequently increase the optimal level of crime. This may happen if the maximal fine, which for clarity will be understood not to include the disgorgement of gains, is less than the monetary value of the harm resulting from the offense.
The explanation for this surprising result, which is discussed in greater detail in Section 3, lies with the impact of an increase in the maximal fine on the deterrent value of enforcement expenditures after the fine is increased and the probability of punishment reduced to maintain the pre-fine-increase optimal level of deterrence. As noted, in the standard law enforcement model, in which offenders' gains are not disgorged, the deterrent value of any 1% increase in the probability of punishment is simply 1% times the level of the optimal fine. In contrast, if offenders' gains from harmful acts can be disgorged, the deterrent value of enforcement expenditures is markedly different. Not only is it greater than 1% times the optimal fine (for the obvious reason that the probability of punishment applies not only to fines but also to the disgorgement of gains), but it is actually an increasing convex function of the probability of punishment itself. So, for example, if the optimal fine is 400 and the probability of punishment is 1/3, the deterrent value of enforcement expenditures is 9; if the probability of punishment is 1/2, the deterrent value is 16; and if the probability of punishment is 2/3, then the deterrent value is 36. Compare these values with the deterrent value in the standard model which is 4 regardless of the probability of punishment. Now, as the maximal fine increases, the pre-fine-increase optimal level of deterrence can be achieved by increasing the optimal fine to the new maximum level and reducing the probability of punishment appropriately. The increase in the optimal fine increases the deterrent value of enforcement expenditures. In contrast, the decrease in the probability of punishment reduces the deterrent value of enforcement expenditures. If the latter effect is greater than the former effect, then the deterrent value of enforcement expenditures at the prefine-increase optimal level of deterrence will be reduced. This implies that it would be socially desirable to lower the enforcement expenditures, so as to achieve a lower level of deterrence.
It should be observed that an increase in the maximal fine unequivocally increases social welfare. The reason is that as the maximal fine rises, any level of deterrence can be obtained at lower enforcement costs. However, as this paper argues, it might nevertheless be socially desirable to achieve less deterrence, because the possible savings in enforcement costs may outweigh the additional social harm associated with less deterrence and more crime.
This paper does not argue that it is common that the optimal level of deterrence falls as maximal fines rise. However, the possible positive relationship between maximal fines and optimal crime levels should not be dismissed for several reasons. First, in many situations, offenders' gains from harmful acts take a monetary or monetary-like form and therefore can be confiscated or disgorged. For example, the gains from all business activities generating external harm are monetary in nature and therefore can be subject to disgorgement. This is in contrast to the standard law enforcement model which assumes that the benefits from harmful acts are non-monetary in nature and therefore cannot be disgorged. Second, as discussed extensively by Bowles et al. (2000 Bowles et al. ( , 2005 , legislation enabling courts to confiscate or remove illegal gains has grown rapidly across a wide range of countries within both civil and common law systems; thus, the possibility to disgorge illegal gains is now a standard feature of the law. Third, the possibility that a rise in maximal fines would lead to lower levels of optimal deterrence might seem unrealistic because, as pointed out, it requires that offenders' wealth or maximal fines would be less than the harm caused by the offense. In reality however, this might be a very common situation. Usually, if offenders' wealth is substantially less than the value of the harm, a substantial degree of under-deterrence will result, unless other forms of punishment such as imprisonment are employed. Indeed, under circumstances of low wealth levels in comparison to harm, the use of imprisonment is generally justified (see Shavell, 1985; Posner, 1985) . However, as will be explained in Section 2, if the gains from harmful acts can be disgorged, under-deterrence need not be substantial even if offenders' wealth is substantially less than the harm. This paper analyzes a simple model of crime and law enforcement which assumes that the gains from harmful acts are monetary or monetary-like in nature and therefore can be disgorged. The model follows a model proposed by Bowles et al. (2000) . However, Bowles et al. focus on deriving the optimal fine and the optimal level of disgorgement of gains in their analysis. They neither explore the optimal probability of punishment or level of deterrence, nor analyze how these variables change when the maximal fine rises. This paper provides such an analysis and shows that, aside from the ambiguous, counter-intuitive effect that a rise in maximal fines has on the optimal level of deterrence, the other canonical results of the standard law enforcement model qualitatively carry over to the present model. For example, even if the gains from crime can be disgorged, optimal law enforcement is characterized by some degree of under-deterrence, that is, by a deterrence level which induces certain offenders to commit harmful acts even though the gains they derive are less than the harm done. 4 Finally, this paper also compares the optimal law enforcement schemes with and without disgorgement of gains, a task which is not fully conducted by Bowles et al. (2000) . It shows, for example, that the possibility of disgorging offenders' gains not only increases social welfare, but also unambiguously increases the optimal level of deterrence, bringing it closer to first-best deterrence. Interestingly then, fines and disgorgement of gains affect optimal deterrence differently: When the level of the maximal fine increases, the optimal level of deterrence may either increase or decrease, while if a greater fraction of offenders' illegal gains can be disgorged, the optimal level of deterrence is always higher.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops a simple model of crime and law enforcement incorporating the option to disgorge the gains that offenders derive from crime, and characterizes the optimal law enforcement scheme. Section 3 then analyzes how optimal law enforcement should change as the maximal fine rises and derives the main results of this paper. Section 4 compares the optimal law enforcement schemes with and without the possibility to disgorge offenders' gains, and shows that as the fraction of disgorging illegal gains increases, the level of optimal deterrence always increases. Section 5 summarizes the analysis. All formal proofs are relegated to the appendix.
THE MODEL
Risk-neutral individuals (or firms) contemplate whether or not to commit a harmful act, causing harm of h . Each individual obtains monetary or monetary-like gains g , which are assumed to be randomly chosen from a continuous uniform distribution function with a density function
, so that some harmful acts are socially desirable in the sense that the gains for certain individuals exceed the harm. These assumptions however are not crucial for our qualitative results. 5 If an individual does commit the harmful act, he will face some probability of being fined and will also risk losing his illicit gains. For clarity, let us define fines as not including the disgorgement of gains. The maximum feasible fine f , so defined, is constrained to max f . Traditionally, max f is interpreted as the level of wealth of individuals above a subsistence level. Alternatively, it can be interpreted as the maximal fine which is allowed by law, for example, for constitutional considerations. Under this interpretation, max f serves as an exogenous legal or constitutional constraint on the level of fines.
In addition to being fined, offenders risk losing the gains they derive from the harmful act. For clarity, let us use the term "punishment" to mean both the fine and the disgorgement of the illicit gains. Assume then that "punishment," so defined, must be uniform for all potential offenders in the sense that it takes the form g f η + , where
is the fraction of the illicit gains that can be confiscated. This will allow the existence of a unique solution to the social problem. Since g is a random variable taking values in the range 0 to 1, punishment will differ among individuals, unless 0 = η ; and the maximum feasible punishment for each individual must be less than g f + max . As usual, fines are assumed to be a socially costless transfer: they entail no administration costs, and the costs imposed on offenders are completely offset by the revenues obtained by the government. The same, it is assumed, applies to the disgorgement of the illicit gains. 6 The costs of apprehending offenders with probability p are assumed to be given by the function cp p c = ) ( , so that total costs are proportional to the probability of punishment, and marginal costs are constant and equal to c . 7
5 The working-paper version of this paper, which is available from the author upon request, uses a generalized form of the distribution of benefits and derives qualitatively similar results to those derived here (Tabbach, 2008) . 6 Observe that these two assumptions need not be strictly so with respect to the disgorgement of gains. First, while fines are socially costless to administer, disgorgement of gains may nevertheless be socially costly (see the treatment in Bowles et al., 2000) . Second, sometimes the loss to offenders is not offset by the gains to the government from disgorgement. For example, if the illicit gains are monetary-like in nature and take the form of illegal goods such as drugs, confiscation has no value in the hands of the government (the police will take steps to destroy the illegal goods). However, in many cases, for example, with respect to stolen goods, the assumptions in the text will be valid. 7 The consequences of assuming that
is a strictly convex function are discussed in Tabbach (2008) .
Social welfare is the sum of gains obtained by those individuals who commit the harmful act, less the harm done, less enforcement costs. To determine social welfare, observe that individuals will commit the harmful act if and only if the gains they derive from doing so exceed the expected punishment they face, that is, iff
which means that the level of deterrence is determined by:
Hence, social welfare can be formulated as:
The social problem is to choose the probability of punishment p , the magnitude of fines f , and the fraction of disgorgement of illegal gains η that maximize (3). The solution to this problem is characterized in the following proposition (asterisks denote optimal choices throughout). reflects the optimal level of deterrence, and it is such that there is some degree of under-deterrence, that is, h g < * . This also implies that
The explanation of Proposition 1 is as follows. The fine should be set at its maximum level, because otherwise it would be possible to increase the fine and reduce the probability of punishment such that the same level of deterrence, including the optimal level of deterrence, would be obtained at lower enforcement costs. The same argument applies, as Bowles et al. (2000) show, to the level of disgorgement, which should be maximal as well.
The optimality of some degree of under-deterrence (Proposition 1(2) ) stems from the equality between the marginal benefits and costs of increasing the probability of punishment at the optimum. The marginal costs are of course positive, so the marginal benefits must be positive as well. But the marginal benefits of increasing the probability of punishment are the benefits resulting from greater deterrence, that is, from less harmful acts committed. If these marginal benefits are positive, then it must be that at the optimum some socially undesirable harmful acts are committed. Put differently, at the optimum, some offenders must commit the harmful act even though the gains they derive are less than the harm, which precisely means that the optimal solution is characterized by some degree of under-deterrence. Proposition 1 (2) can be viewed as a generalization of the standard result in the economic literature regarding the optimality of under-deterrence. 8 Before proceeding, let us point to two differences between the present model and the standard law enforcement model in which offenders' gains cannot be disgorged. First, in the standard model, the optimal expected punishment is invariant to offenders' gains and less than the harm to all individuals. In contrast, in the present model, the optimal expected punishment increases with the gains that offenders derive. It is less than the harm for all individuals for whom h g < , but might be more than the harm if the reverse is true. Nevertheless, since the optimal expected punishment increases with the gains from the harmful act at a lower rate than the gains themselves (more precisely at a rate * p which is less than 1), over-deterrence does not result. 9 Second, in the standard model, if offenders' wealth or the maximum fine level is substantially less than the harm, a substantial level of under-deterrence is inevitable. In contrast, in the present model, under similar conditions, a significant level of deterrence can still be achieved if the probability of punishment is sufficiently high. For example, with 3 / 2 = p , a level of deterrence which is twice as large as offenders' wealth can be achieved ( max 2 f g = , equation 2), while with 5 / 4 = p , a level of deterrence which is four times higher than the wealth of offenders is achievable ( max 4 f g = , equation 2). 8 As is well known, standard optimal law enforcement models show that the optimal expected fine is less than harm,
, so that under-deterrence prevails, and also that the optimal probability of punishment is less than the harm divided by offenders' wealth,
. See, for example, Garoupa (1997) , Polinsky and Shavell (1999, 2007) . 9 Indeed, it can be demonstrated that first-best deterrence, although not socially optimal, can be achieved in the present model by setting
See Tabbach (2008) .
MAXIMAL FINES RISE
Suppose now that offenders' wealth has increased or, perhaps more realistically, that the legal or constitutional constraint on the level of maximal fines has been relaxed, how will social welfare and optimal law enforcement change? Social welfare will clearly increase, because any level of deterrence, including the pre-fine-increase level of deterrence, can be achieved by increasing the punishment and reducing the probability of punishment appropriately so as to save enforcement costs. For precisely this reason, the optimal fine level should increase as well to its new maximal level. In addition, as in the standard law enforcement model, the optimal probability of punishment may either go up or down, depending on the degree of under-deterrence. More precisely, Proposition 2: As the maximal fine increases, the optimal probability of punishment increases (decreases) if
Proposition 2, which is completely analogous to Garoupa's (2001) result, can be explained in the following way. The increase in the maximal and, accordingly, optimal fine generates two effects. First, the gains from further deterrence are reduced, because the level of deterrence increases and, therefore, the marginal offenders impose less net harm from committing the harmful act. Second, as the optimal fine increases, the impact of the probability of punishment on the expected fine and accordingly the level of deterrence, that is, the deterrent value of enforcement expenditures is increased. Now, if the level of under-deterrence is relatively low, the reduction in the gains from further deterrence dominates the increased deterrent value of enforcement expenditures, and calls for reducing the optimal probability of punishment. This possibility is most vivid if the level of under-deterrence is very low, so that an increase in the fine level will itself lead to over-deterrence. Then, there will actually be social losses from further deterrence, so the optimal probability of punishment should definitely decrease. On the other hand, if the level of under-deterrence is substantial, the increase in the deterrent value of enforcement expenditures outweighs the reduction in the gains from more deterrence. Therefore, a higher level of deterrence should be achieved not merely by increasing the optimal fine, but also by increasing the optimal probability of punishment. To illustrate the last possibility numerically, suppose that the maximal fine is 400 and the harm is 200. If the optimal probability of punishment is 0.1, the optimal level of deterrence will be 44.4 [0.1 x 400/(1-0.1), Proposition 1(2)], which is substantially less than half the level of harm. The marginal offenders impose net harm of 155.6 [200 -44.4] , which is also, therefore, the marginal benefits from greater deterrence. The deterrent value of enforcement expenditures is 4.94 [1% x 400/(1-0.1) 2 ], 10 and therefore the marginal benefits from greater enforcement are 768.67 [155.6 x4.94] . 11 If maximal fines, and accordingly, optimal fines increased from 400 to 420, that is, by 5%, the level of deterrence would increase from 44.4 to 46.6 [0.1 x 420/(1 -0.1)], and the marginal benefits from further deterrence would reduce from 155.6 to 153.33 [200 -46.66] , that is, by less than 2%. In contrast, the deterrent value of enforcement expenditures would rise from 4.94 to 5.19 [1% x 420/(1 -0.1) 2 ], that is, by 5%. As is clear, the increase in the deterrent value of enforcement expenditures more than offsets the reduction in the gains from greater deterrence; and, therefore, the marginal benefits from greater enforcement are increased from 768.67 to 795.78 [153.33 x 5.19 ]. Therefore, it will be socially desirable to spend more on enforcement and increase the optimal probability of punishment.
Proposition 2 implies that the probability and magnitude of fines may be substitutes or complements. When they are complements, the level of deterrence clearly increases as the maximal fine rises. However, as we will now explain, when the probability and magnitude of fines are substitutes, the level of deterrence may paradoxically and contrary to commonly held views decrease as the maximal fine rises.
Proposition 3: As the maximal fine increases, the optimal level of deterrence increases (decreases) if
The explanation for this surprising result lies with the deterrent value of enforcement expenditures. In contrast to the standard law enforcement model, in which the deterrent value of enforcement expenditures is simply 1% times the optimal fine, in the present model, it depends not only on the level of fines, but also on the probability of punishment. Moreover, the deterrent value of enforcement expenditures, which is generally given by
as the probability of punishment rises, and does so at increasing rates. To illustrate, if 400 = f , then the deterrent value of a 1% increase in the probability of punishment is only 4.04 for 01 . 0 = p ; it becomes 9 for 10 The general formula is given by
; it rises to 16 for 2 / 1 = p ; and it reaches 36 for 3 / 2 = p . The reason for this is that the probability of punishment affects not only the fine, but also the gains that offenders derive from the harmful act. As the probability of punishment increases, a greater fraction of offenders' gains are eventually disgorged, and this has a greater impact on the level of deterrence. Now as the maximal fine, and accordingly, the optimal fine increase, the probability of punishment can be reduced so as to save enforcement costs. This, as Proposition 2 states, will happen if optimal deterrence is less than half the harm. However, as the probability of punishment decreases, the deterrent value of enforcement expenditures, on this account, is decreased. Therefore, there are two opposing effects: On the one hand, the deterrent value of enforcement expenditures is increased because the optimal fine is higher (the fine effect); on the other hand, the deterrent value of enforcement expenditures tends to be lower as the probability of punishment is lower (the probability-of-punishment effect). Proposition 3 implies that these opposing effects, whose relative magnitude should be evaluated at the pre-fine-increase level of deterrence, 12 c a n c e l o u t e x a c t l y i f max * f g = ( o r , e q u i v a l e n t l y , i f 2 / 1 * = p ), while the fine effect dominates the probability-of-punishment effect if
, and the reverse is true if
). To illustrate this numerically, suppose that the optimal fine is 400 and the optimal probability of punishment is 1/2, so that the optimal level of deterrence is 400 [0.5 x 400/(1-0.5)], which is precisely the maximum fine level. The deterrent value of a 1% increase in the probability of punishment is 16 [1% x 400/(1-0.5) 2 ]. Suppose now that the maximal and optimal fines increase from 400 to 500, that is, by 25%. In such a case, to achieve the same level of deterrence, the probability of punishment should be decreased from 0.5 to 0.44 [0.44 x 500/(1-0.44)]. It can be easily verified that the deterrent value of a 1% increase in the probability of punishment remains 16 [1% x 500/(1-0.44) 2 ]. Therefore, the level of deterrence should not change. Suppose, however, that the optimal probability of punishment were only 1/3 (<1/2), so that the optimal level of deterrence would be 200 [0.33 x 400/(1-0.33)], which is less than the maximal fine. The deterrent value of a 1% increase in the probability of punishment would be 9 [1% x 400/(1-0.33) 2 ]. To maintain the 12 The reason for this is that before the maximal fine increase, the optimal probability of punishment and level of deterrence were determined at the point of equality between the marginal costs and benefits of enforcement expenditures. Therefore, the critical question for determining whether optimal deterrence increases or decreases is how these marginal costs and benefits change after the optimal fine increases and the probability of punishment decreases, while the pre-fine-increase level of deterrence remains the same. It should also be observed that, by assumption, the marginal costs of enforcement are constant and therefore unaffected. same level of deterrence, after the optimal fine increases from 400 to 500, the probability of punishment should be reduced from 0.33 to 0.286 [0.286 x 500/(1-0.286)]. Therefore the deterrent value of a 1% i n c r e a s e i n t h e probability of punishment would increase from 9 to 9.8 [1% x 500/(1-0.286) 2 ]. Consequently, the optimal level of deterrence should increase as well. Finally, suppose that the optimal probability of punishment and level of deterrence were 2/3 (>1/2) and 800 [0.67 x 400/(1-0.67)], respectively. The deterrent value of enforcement expenditures would be 36 [1% x 400/(1-0.67) 2 ]. An increase in the optimal fine from 400 to 500 accompanied by a decrease in the probability of punishment from 0.67 to 0.615 [0.615 x 500/(1-0.615)] to maintain the same level of deterrence, would reduce the deterrent value of a 1% increase in the probability of punishment from 36 to 33.7 [1% x 500/(1-0.615) 2 ]. In such a case, the optimal level of deterrence should go down. From Proposition 1 (2), we know that the optimal level of deterrence is less than the harm. Therefore, if the level of the maximal fine is equal to or greater than the harm, the optimal level of deterrence will necessarily be less than the maximal fine, implying that, in those cases, the optimal level of deterrence will increase with maximal fines, as is commonly expected. On the other hand, if the level of the maximal fine is less than the harm, the optimal level of deterrence may be either higher or lower than the maximal fine and, equivalently, the probability of punishment may be either higher or lower than 1/2. Therefore, h f < max is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the optimal level of deterrence to decrease as the maximal fine increases. This condition, which can be interpreted, for example, as a situation in which offender's wealth is less than the harm, is not necessarily uncommon in reality. Indeed, in many situations, potential offenders cause great harm and possess in comparison very little wealth, so they are effectively judgment-proof. In standard law enforcement models which disregard the possibility of disgorging offenders' gains, it is observed that if offenders' wealth is substantially less than the harm, substantial under-deterrence will result, unless other forms of punishment such as imprisonment are utilized. Indeed, a severe problem of under-deterrence justifies the use of expensive forms of punishment such as imprisonment (see Shavell, 1985; Posner, 1985) . However, if offenders' gains can be disgorged, a substantial level of under-deterrence does not necessarily result even if offenders' wealth is substantially less than the harm. As a matter of fact, as pointed out in Section 2, if offenders' wealth is substantially less than the harm, then in order to achieve a significant level of deterrence, the probability of punishment should be relatively high.
As noted, h f < max is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the optimal level of deterrence to decrease as maximal fines rise. In addition, it should be the case that the optimal level of deterrence is rather high, which requires that the costs of enforcement are relatively low. Otherwise, if the costs of enforcement are relatively high, the optimal probability of punishment would be relatively low (indeed it may even drop to zero).
DISGORGEMENT VERSUS NO-DISGORGEMENT
The previous section analyzes how an increase in the maximal fine affects optimal law enforcement if offenders' gains from the harmful act can be disgorged. A natural, analogous question is how the possibility to disgorge offenders' gains affects social welfare and optimal law enforcement. This question can be interpreted in two ways: one, as a question concerning the comparison between optimal law enforcement with and without disgorgement of offenders' gains, and second, as an inquiry of how increasing the fraction of gains that can be physically (or legally) disgorged affects optimal law enforcement. 13 Bowles et al. (2000) provide an important analysis of the removal of illegal gains. However, as pointed out in the introduction, they focus in their analysis on deriving the optimal fine and the optimal level of disgorgement of gains, assuming alternatively that disgorgement of gains is socially costless or socially costly. Bowles et al. also suggest that disgorgement of gains is socially desirable and that it allows for the achievement of greater deterrence, but they do not provide a formal proof or a satisfactory explanation with respect to the latter claim.
It should be clear that the possibility of disgorging offenders' gains increases social welfare, because this option allows the achievement of any level of deterrence at lower enforcement costs (see also Bowles et al., 2000) . It is also clear that offenders' gains should be disgorged to the maximum extent possible, assuming that disgorgement, like levying fines, is a socially costless transfer (see Bowles et al. (2000) and Proposition 1(1)). In addition, we can establish that the optimal probability of punishment may either increase or decrease as the fraction of disgorgement is increased, depending on the degree of underdeterrence. More precisely, Proposition 4: As the fraction of offenders' gains that can be disgorged increases, the optimal probability of punishment increases (decreases) if
13 The latter view assumes that there is some physical or legal constraint on the fraction of illegal gains that can be disgorged and examines the consequences of relaxing such a constraint; for example, imagine that law enforcement gets better at recovering a larger fraction of offenders' gains. Nevertheless, this paper does not examine the costs of disgorging offenders' gains or possible measures of offenders to dispose of their wealth or of their gains.
The explanation of this result is analogous to that of Proposition 2 and, therefore, omitted. 14 Finally, we can establish that:
Proposition 5: As the fraction of offenders' gains that can be disgorged increases, the optimal level of deterrence increases and gets closer to first-best deterrence. Therefore, the optimal level of deterrence is higher with disgorgement than without it.
Proposition 5 is perhaps not surprising. However, in light of proposition 2, it deserves explanation. The explanation lies again with the impact of enforcement expenditures on deterrence. As the fraction of offenders' gains that can be disgorged increases, the deterrent value of enforcement expenditures is increased (the disgorgement effect). On the other hand, since the probability of punishment can and will be reduced in order to save enforcement costs if 3 / 2 * h g > (see Proposition 4), the deterrent value of enforcement expenditures, on this account, tends to be lower (the probabilityof-punishment effect). Proposition 5 guarantees, however, that the former effect will always dominate the latter effect. The reason for this is that the deterrent value of enforcement expenditures, which is now generally given by
, depends on the product of the probability of punishment and the disgorgement of gains, while the reduction in the probability of punishment, which is required to maintain the level of deterrence after the level of disgorgement is increased, is less than proportional to the increase in the disgorgement level. Therefore, the deterrent value of enforcement expenditures always increases and, as a result, the optimal level of deterrence increases as the fraction of offenders' gains that can be disgorged is increased. To illustrate this numerically, suppose that . Now suppose that the disgorgement level is increased from 0.4 to 0.5, that is, by 25%. To maintain the level of deterrence, the probability of punishment should be reduced from 0.2 to 0.196 [0.196 x 400/(1-0.196 x 0.5] , that is, by only 2%. Therefore, as η i n c r e a s e s a n d p i s r e d u c e d t o m a i n t a i n t h e p r edisgorgement-increase optimal level of deterrence, the product p η is actually 14 It should be noted that the complementarity between the disgorgement of offenders' gains and the optimal probability of punishment may seem more or less likely than the complementarity between maximal fines and the optimal probability of punishment, because it requires that 3 / 2 * h g < rather than 2 / * h g < . However, it should be remembered that the level of deterrence is generally higher as the fraction of the gains from the harmful acts which is disgorged is higher (see Proposition 5). 
CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY
This paper analyzes the optimal law enforcement scheme if the gains from harmful acts are monetary or monetary-like in nature and therefore can be subject to disgorgement. It also compares this optimal law enforcement scheme to the optimal law enforcement scheme that prevails if offenders' gains cannot be disgorged (for example, because the gains are non-monetary in nature). An important issue which is explored concerns the effects of increasing the maximal fine. This issue is significant because it can describe situations in which legal constraints on the maximum level of fines are relaxed, or, alternatively, situations in which offenders' resources are increased. The main results of the analysis are summarized in Tables 1 and 2 . 
